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Abstract
We analyze a general search model with on-the-job search (OJS) and sorting
of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs. For given values of non-market
time, the relative e¢ ciency of OJS, and the amount of search frictions, we derive a
simple relationship between the unemployment rate, mismatch and wage dispersion.
We estimate the latter two from standard micro data. Our methodology accounts
for measurement error, which is crucial to distinguish true from spurious mismatch
and wage dispersion. We nd that without frictions, output would be about 9.5%
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higher if rms can commit to pay wages as a function of match quality and 15.5%
higher if they cannot. Non-commitment leads to a business-stealing externality
which causes a 5.5% drop in output.
JEL codes: E24, J62, J63, J64
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1 Introduction
Labor productivity depends crucially on the proper sorting of worker types into job types,
a process that is hindered by search frictions. If all unemployed workers and jobs were
alike, it would be hard to imagine why it takes workers months to nd a suitable job.
But also if workers and jobs were heterogeneous but search frictions were absent, the loss
in output due to mismatch would be irrelevant because all workers would be matched
to their optimal job types. This paper explicitly models this interaction between search
frictions and heterogeneity and estimates the output loss due to search frictions. This
loss is then decomposed in its three components: (i) unemployment, (ii) resources spent
on recruitment activities and (iii) mismatch. We also estimate the output loss that can
be attributed to the inability of employers to commit to future wage payments. Only this
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loss can potentially be reduced by policy intervention.
The starting point of this paper is the framework of Gautier, Teulings and Van Vuuren
(2010) who analyze a class of search models with on-the-job (OJS) search and worker and
job heterogeneity where the productivity of a match depends on the degree of mismatch.
Their production function can be interpreted as a second-order Taylor approximation
of a more general specication of the production technology. Within this framework,
various wage mechanisms can be analyzed such as wage posting with full commitment, as
in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps, van den Berg, and Robin (2000), and
wage mechanisms without commitment, as in Coles (2001) and Shimer (2006). The key
di¤erence between wage setting with and without commitment is that in the former case,
rms pay both hiring and no-quit premiums, whereas in the latter case, rms pay only
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no-quit premiums. Our model is related to hedonic pricing/assignment/sorting models
in which worker types are imperfect substitutes in the spirit of Rosen (1974), Sattinger
(1975) and Teulings (1995, 2005). Intuitively, the less substitutable worker types are,
the larger will be the productivity loss due to mismatch. We use a relation between
Katz and Murphys (1992) elasticity of complementarity between high- and low-skilled
workers and the curvature of the production function. This curvature determines how
sensitive output is to the degree of mismatch. In a Walrasian equilibrium, the above
models generate a perfect sorting of high-skilled workers at complex jobs. With search
frictions, this perfect correlation breaks down. Within the class of sorting models with
search frictions, a distinction can be made between hierarchical models, like Shimer and
Smith (2000), and circle models, like Marimon and Zillibotti (1999). Since circle models
3
are more easy to handle analytically than hierarchical models, we apply a circle model in
our theoretical analysis.1
We show that the equilibrium depends on just four parameters: (i) the value of non-
market time, (ii) the relative e¢ ciency of on- versus o¤-the-job search, (iii) the curvature
of the production function (i.e. how fast output falls with the degree of mismatch), and
(iv) a composite parameter that measures the amount of search frictions. The relevance
of our model depends on how well it can match the empirical values for these parameters.
The main hurdle is to obtain estimates for wage dispersion and the output loss due to
mismatch. We follow Gautier and Teulings (2006) by using data on wages and on worker
1We can still match moments generated by a hierarchical process because analytical conclusions from
a circle model translate into a hierarchical setting because the former can be viewed of as a second order
Taylor approximation of the latter, see Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2005). The intuition is that
in hierarchical models, the output and wage loss due to mismatch also depends on the expected distance
to ones optimal job type.
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and job characteristics to construct an empirical measure for mismatch. We also o¤er a
new simple statistic for wage dispersion due to search frictions, namely the intercept of a
simple quadratic wage regression with appropriately normalized measures for worker and
job characteristics (this measures the di¤erence between the expected maximum and the
average wage). The simplicity of this measure makes it easily applicable. Since observed
mismatch can be either real or due to measurement error, it is important to correct for
this. We show how to do that. Given wage dispersion and mismatch, our model implies a
value for the unemployment rate. We nd values that are close to the empirical values of
about 5%: Hence, our model can jointly explain the observed wage dispersion for workers
with equal skill and unemployment.
We use the model to calculate the total output loss due to search frictions, which
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we estimate to be between 9 and 16% of the total value added of labour, depending on
whether rms can or cannot commit to paying hiring premiums. Unemployment accounts
for less than 30% of this loss. If rms cannot commit to wages, their quasi-rents are
higher than in the social optimum, due to a business-stealing externality. As a result of
free entry, these quasi-rents are all spent on (excess) vacancy creation. The estimated
output loss due to this business-stealing externality is 5:5% of the total value added of
labour. This externality can potentially be reduced by policies that shift rents from the
rms to the workers.2
Most of the literature on sorting with frictions considers global absolute advantages of
high-skilled workers. Atakan (2006) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2009) consider a simplied
2In Gautier et al. (2014) we show that if a union sets pay scales ex ante to reduce the business
externality, it will set the lowest wage on the pay scale too high which increases unemployment and may
actually reduce welfare.
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version of Shimer and Smith (2000). Similar to our model, wages are highest at the
optimal assignment and they are lower at both less and more complex jobs. Their model
is however less suitable to bring to the data. Hagedorn, Law and Manovskii (2012) show
how both the Shimer and Smith (2000) model and our model are non-parametrically
identied from individual wage data from rm-worker data sets. The idea is that wages
are informative about the ranks of worker types within each rm. Bagger and Lentz
(2012) consider a sorting model where workers search most intensively for the jobs where
they earn the highest wages. Lise and Robin (2013) consider a sorting model with on-the-
job search that focuses on the macro dynamics in the presence of aggregate shocks. Lise,
Meghir and Robin (2012), Lopes de Melo (2008) and Bartolucci and Devicienti (2012)
also look at sorting in models with OJS. Their focus is on interpreting the correlations
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between worker and rm xed e¤ects. Under comparative advantage, this issue is not
very meaningful. For example, in Teulings and Gautier (2004), complex jobs do not have
an absolute advantage over simple jobs. They only have a comparative advantage when
occupied by better-skilled workers. Since skilled workers have an absolute advantage,
workers employed in more-complex jobs earn higher wages but the higher wages are not
due to the job, but to the type of workers that occupy these jobs. In this context, one
can just reverse the ordering of job types to change from negative to positive assortative
matching. Without loss of generality, we focus on the latter. An important di¤erence
between the empirical sorting models described above and ours is that all jobs in a rm
have the same xed e¤ect. We do not make that assumption. Cornfeld (2014) considers
a di¤erent type of sorting model where skill is dened as the set of tasks that a worker
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can perform. Finally, Jovanovic (2013) looks at the e¤ect of misallocation in the labor
market on growth in a model where agents must learn about their abilities and
Concerning wage dispersion, Hornstein et al. (2010) also derive a simple relationship
between the unemployment rate and wage dispersion, the mean-min ratio. We show
that this measure is sensitive to measurement error. They argue that search models
without OJS cannot explain the coexistence of a low unemployment rate and substantial
wage dispersion because the former suggests low frictions, while the latter suggests high
frictions. Gautier and Teulings (2006) made a similar point. This issue can be resolved
by allowing for OJS, since this lowers the reservation wage (consequently wage dispersion
rises and the unemployment rate falls). Allowing for OJS is also quantitatively important,
since Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Nagypal (2005) show that job-to-job ows are
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substantial.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the
model of Gautier, Teulings and Van Vuuren (2010) as a point of reference for the rest
of the paper. Section 3 discusses how we can identify and measure mismatch and wage
dispersion in the presence of measurement error. Section 4 presents the calibration results,
the estimation of the output loss due to search frictions and the decomposition of this
loss. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
Production
There is a continuum of worker types, s; and job types, c; s and c are locations on a circle.
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Workers can only produce output when matched to a job. The productivity of a match
of worker type s to job type c depends on the shortest distance jxj between s and c along
the circumference of the circle. Y (x) has an interior maximum at x = 0 and is symmetric
around this maximum Y (0) (normalized to unity). Finally, Y (x) is twice di¤erentiable
and strictly concave. We consider the simplest functional form that meets these criteria:
Y (x) = 1  1
2
x2: (1)
We call x the mismatch indicator. The parameter  determines the substitutability of
worker types: the lower , the more easily worker types can be substituted. Y (x) can be
interpreted as a second-order Taylor approximation around the optimal assignment of a
more general production technology. Since the rst derivative of a continuous production
function equals zero in the optimal assignment, Y 0 (0) = 0, the rst-order term drops out.
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We are interested in equilibria where unemployed job seekers do not accept all job o¤ers,
which imposes a minimum constraint on .3
Labor supply and the value of non-market time
Labor supply per s-type is uniformly distributed over the circumference of the circle.
Total labor supply in period t equals L(t). We normalize the labor force at t = 0 to
one. Unemployed workers receive the value of non-market time B. Employed workers
supply a xed amount of labor (normalized to one), and their payo¤ is equal to the wage
they receive. Workers live forever. They maximize the discounted value of their expected
lifetime payo¤s.
Golden-growth path
3A su¢ cient condition for this is that Y (x) < 0 for at least some x.
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We study the economy while it is on a golden-growth path, where the discount rate
 > 0 is equal to the growth rate of the labor force. Hence, the size of the labor force
is L(t) = exp(t). The assumption of a golden-growth path buys us a lot in terms of
transparency and tractability. The golden-growth assumption is a generalisation of the
assumption of zero discounting (zero discounting is the special case of the golden-growth
being equal to zero), an assumption that is often applied in the wage posting literature,
see for example Burdett and Mortensen (1998). New workers enter the labor force as
unemployed. Since labor supply at t = 0 and the productivity in the optimal assignment
Y (0) are normalized to one, the output of this economy would be equal to one in the
absence of search frictions.
Job o¤er arrival rates and job destruction
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Unemployed job seekers receive job o¤ers at a rate . Workers receive job o¤ers at a rate
 . The parameter  ; 0    1; measures the e¢ ciency of on- relative to o¤-the-job
search;  = 0 is the case without OJS;  = 1 is the case where on- and o¤-the-job search
are equally e¢ cient. Matches between workers and jobs are destroyed at an exogenous
rate  > 0.
As is well known in the job search literature, see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
the number of parameters can be reduced by introducing a composite parameter4,
  2
+ 
:
Hence, we can ignore the separate parameters ; ; and , and focus on the composite
parameter  instead.
4It is convenient to add a factor 2 to the denition of  to account for the fact that this model is
symmetric around the optimal allocation x = 0. Hence, job o¤ers with positive and negative values of x
are equivalent.
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Vacancy creation and contact technology
For our empirical analysis, we can ignore the process of vacancy creation and the job o¤er
arrival technology that underlies the value of . However, when analyzing the output loss
due to search frictions and the constrained e¢ ciency of the equilibrium, we have to be
explicit about vacancy creation and the contact technology. We assume that there is free
entry of vacancies for all c-types. The cost of maintaining a vacancy is equal to K per
period. After a vacancy is lled, the rms only cost is the workers wage. The supply of
vacancies is determined by a zero prot condition. Vacancies are uniformly distributed
over the circumference of the circle. When a worker leaves a job, this job disappears.
Let u be the unemployment rate. Due to the normalization of labor supply to one,
u is equal to the number of unemployed. Then, the e¤ective number of job seekers is
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equal to the number of unemployed plus the number of employed weighted by the relative
e¢ ciency of on-the-job search, u+  (1  u). The job-o¤er-arrival rate  is a function of
the e¤ective supply of job seekers and the number of vacancies, v:
 = 0 [u+  (1  u)]  v; (2)
where 0  (; )  1. This specication embodies two important special cases: (i) for
 = 0 and  = ; 0 <  < 1,  = 0 (u=v)
 : the classical Pissarides constant-returns-
to-scale matching function; (ii) for  = 1;  = 0: the quadratic contact technology. Note
that for  = 1, the value of  is irrelevant. Hence, the case  = 1;  = 1 is equivalent to
the quadratic contact technology in this setting. Finally, note that for our purposes, we
do not need to know K because any decrease in K can be captured by a corresponding
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increase in .5 6
Wage setting
Wages, denoted by W (x), are set unilaterally by the rm, conditional on the mismatch
indicator x in the current job. We analyze wage setting under two di¤erent assumptions.
Under the rst assumption, rms can commit to a future wage payment contingent on x.
Then, rms pay both no-quit and hiring premiums. That is, they account for the positive
e¤ect of a higher wage o¤er on reduced quitting and increased hiring as in Burdett and
5Shifting K to 2K so that v shifts to v=2 together with shifting 0 to 2
 
0 does not e¤ect the
equilibrium.
6The number of free parameters can be reduced even further. If we replace  by    2,  can be
normalized to one. When we simultaneously increase  to 2 and  to 4, this is equivalent to increasing
simultaneously the job search e¢ ciency and the cost of a bad match. As a result, the upper bound x
would shrink to 12 x, but for the rest, everything would remain the same. The composite parameter 
can be interpreted as a summary statistic for search frictions. Details of this transformation are in Web
Appendix C.4 In our empirical application, we need a particular normalization for x and, so we do not
apply the nal normalization here.
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Mortensen (1988). Under the second assumption, rms are unable to commit to future
wage payments. In this case, hiring premiums are non-credible because immediately after
the worker has accepted the job, the rm has no incentive to continue paying a hiring
premium, since the worker cannot return to her previous job. Workers anticipate this,
and will therefore not respond to this premium in the rst place, which means that rms
will not o¤er it. No-quit premiums are credible even without commitment because it is
in the rms interest to pay them as soon as the worker has accepted the job, for if the
rm does not pay them the worker will quit as soon as a better outside o¤er arrives.
Since the equilibrium of this economy and its comparative statics are analyzed exten-
sively in Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2010), we will only provide a short summary
of the main results that are needed for the empirical implementation, below.
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2.2 Characterization of the equilibrium
The equilibrium of this economy is characterized by a wage function W (x) and an upper
bound x for the absolute value of the mismatch indicator jxj. Job o¤ers with a higher value
of x will not be accepted. Since the model is symmetric around x = 0, W (jxj) = W (x).
For sake of notational convenience, we focus on the case x  0. Wages are decreasing
in the mismatch indicator x: the lower the mismatch, the higher the wage rate paid by
rms.7 The upper bound x implies a value for u (for a derivation see Web Appendix C.1)
u =
1
1 + x
:
Note that the model is very similar to the stochastic job search model of Pissarides (2000)
extended with on-the-job search and the constraint that the derivative of Y (x) is zero in
7See Gautier et al. (2010) for a proof. The logic is the same as why bid functions in auction theory
are increasing in valuations.
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the optimal assignment, x = 0.8 A worker accepts any job o¤er with a wage above his
current wage and consequently with a mismatch indicator smaller than in his current job.
Unemployed workers accept only job o¤ers with x < x.
Bellman equations under the Golden Growth assumption
Due to the golden-growth assumption, asset values for job seekers and employed workers
take a simple form that can be easily interpreted. Let V U and V E be the asset values of an
unemployed and an employed worker at her marginal job type (with mismatch indicator
x) respectively and let ExY and ExW denote the expected output and wage respectively
(the expectation being taken over the mismatch indicator x among employed workers).
8The only di¤erence is that under free entry the composition of vacancies adjusts to the composition
of the unemployment.
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Then
V U = uB + (1  u)ExW; (3)
V E =
uW (x) +  (1  u)ExW
u+  (1  u) ;
vK = (1  u) (ExY   ExW ) :
The derivation of these Bellman equations can be found in Web Appendix C.2. The
values of unemployment and employment are a weighted average of the expected payo¤s
in the states of employment and unemployment. For the value of unemployment, the
expected payo¤s are weighted by their share in the total population. The total expected
cost of vacancy creation are equal to expected prots, which in turn are equal to expected
productivity minus expected wages times employment. The Bellman equations take this
simple form due to the Golden Growth assumption that the growth rate of the workforce
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is equal to the discount rate.
The output loss due to search frictions
The output loss due to search frictions can be dened as,
X  (1  u) (1  ExY ) + u (1 B) + vK: (4)
The output loss is made up of the three components, each of them reected by a term
in equation (4). The loss due to: (i) mismatch, (ii) unemployment, and (iii) the cost of
vacancy creation and recruitment. The loss due to mismatch is equal to the employment
rate 1 u times the di¤erence between productivity in the optimal assignment, Y (0) = 1,
and the expected productivity in the actual assignment, ExY . The loss due to unemploy-
ment is equal to the unemployment rate u times the di¤erence between the productivity
in the optimal assignment and the value of non-market time 1 B. The cost of vacancies
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is equal to the vacancy rate v times the cost of a vacancy K.
Two components of this output loss are hard to measure, namely the cost of vacancies
vK and the productivity loss due to mismatch ExY . However, under free entry, all
prots are spent on vacancy creation so we can substitute equation (??) in. After some
rearrangement, we obtain
X = u (1 B) + (1  u) (1  ExW ) = 1  V U : (5)
The simple relation X = 1   V U can be understood easily. Without search frictions,
workers would be costlessly assigned to their optimal assignment where they earn a wage
equal to one and there would be no vacancy cost. Equations (4) and (5) allow us to
estimate the output loss due to search frictions and decompose this loss into its three
components.
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Wage formation
The denition of x as the upper bound of the mismatch indicator implies that for this
level of x; wages are equal to output
cW (x) = bY (x) = 1  1
2
x2: (6)
At the marginal job type, all the surplus should go to the worker. If not, the rms would
expand their matching set. On the worker side, the denition of x being the upper bound
of x implies that an unemployed worker is indi¤erent between accepting this job or staying
unemployed. Hence, V E = V U . Substituting equation (3) in this condition yields
cW (x) = [u+  (1  u)]B + (1  [u+  (1  u)])ExW: (7)
Since ExW > B, cW (x)  B: the lowest wage is greater or equal to the value of leisure.
When  < 1, a job seeker reduces his chances of nding an even better job by accepting
24
a job. The excess of the marginal wage o¤er relative to the value of leisure compensates
for this loss in the option value of nding a better job. Only when on- and o¤-the-job
search are equally e¢ cient,  = 1, equation (7) simplies to cW (x) = B.
Next, consider the wage for better matches, 0  x < x We have two cases, one
where rms can commit on paying hiring premiums and one where rms cannot; for a full
derivation, we refer to Gautier et al. (2010) and web Appendix C.4.
When rms can commit on future wage payments, the optimal wage policy of the rm
maximizes the expected value of a vacancy. Even though rms have all the bargaining
power, they pay positive wages in order to (i) stimulate new workers to come and (ii)
prevent existing workers from quitting. When rms cannot commit on future wage pay-
ments, hiring premiums are non-credible since rms would stop paying them as soon as
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the worker has accepted the job. Hence, rms only pay no quit premia.
Figure 1 depicts bY (x) and cW (x) for both cases with and without commitment. We
use the benchmark values for B; ;  and  which will be motivated in Section 3.4 below.
Contrary to bY (x), cW (x) is non-di¤erentiable at x = 0. This is due to the hiring and no-
quit premiums that rms pay. Since the density of employment is highest for low values
of jxj, the elasticity of labor supply is high for these types of jobs. A slight variation in
wages has large e¤ects both on the probability that workers accept an outside job o¤er
and on the number of workers who are prepared to accept the wage o¤er (the latter being
relevant in the case with commitment only). Hence, rms will bid up wages aggressively
for those types of jobs. Figure 1 shows that the wage in the optimal assignment is higher
when rms can commit than when they cannot, since the ability to commit increases
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competition between rms for workers. Figure 1 also reveals that for x = 0 the slope
of the wage function is smaller (in absolute value) for the case with commitment than
without commitment.
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Figure 1: Productivity bY (z) and the shape ofcW (z) in di¤erent regimes, B = 0:4;  = 0:54,
 = 1:8,  is chosen such that u = 5%
The dashed line is the wage function that would apply under Nash bargaining without
OJS which underlies the analysis in Gautier and Teulings (2006). This wage function does
not feature the non-di¤erentiability at x = 0. It is just a simple parabola. In this paper
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we extend the methodology applied in Gautier and Teulings (2006) for estimating search
frictions to the more complex shape of the wage function for the case with OJS. Note
that without OJS, we have to assume Nash bargaining, since wage setting by the rm, as
is assumed here, would lead to the Diamond paradox of all wage o¤ers being equal to the
value of leisure and the full surplus going to the rm. With OJS, competition for workers
between rms provides workers with market power (especially for x close to 0) even when
they have no bargaining power at all.
The distribution of x among employed workers
The distribution of x among employed workers, bG (x), is given by,
bG (x) = 1  x  x
(1 +  x)x
: (8)
See web Appendix C.1 for a derivation. Figure 2 depicts this distribution function and
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the density function that goes with it. The vertical line gives the upper support, x. The
main message from Figure 2 is that the distribution of x has a large probability mass
close to zero (the optimal assignment) and a long right tail of bad matches. The median
value of x is equal to (1   u)=(1 + u) < 1, which is far smaller than the upper support
x = (1   u)=u for reasonable values of u. In fact, 80% of the workers has x < 5. The
reason for this pattern is that workers who are matched badly quit their jobs fast so
their density is low. The reverse holds for good matches, so their density is high. The
skewness of the distribution of the mismatch parameter has profound consequences for
the di¤erence in wage dispersion between the commitment and no commitment cases.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be summarized by three relations as a function of the models
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Figure 2: The distribution (solid) and density function (dashed) of x conditional on
employment, parameters same as in Figure 1
four parameters B; ;  and 
cW (0)  ExW = fW (B; ; ; ) ; (9)
bY (0)  ExY = eY (B; ; ; ) = 1
2
Var [x] ;
u = u (B; ; ; ) :
For all three relations there are two versions, one for the case with commitment and
one for the case without. The analytical expressions for these functions are presented
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in Web appendices, C.5, C.1 and C.4. cW (0) ExW , the max-mean wage di¤erential,
can be interpreted as a measure of wage dispersion or the wage loss due to mismatch.
For the relevant range of , the partial derivatives of fW (B; ; ; ), eY (B; ; ; ) and
u (B; ; ; ) with respect to  are negative. Other things equal, an increase in search
frictions (a lower value of ) leads to more wage dispersion, more output loss due to
mismatch, and more unemployment. These relations lay the foundations for our empirical
inference.
The max-min wage di¤erential is larger in the case with commitment because the
maximum is higher, see Figure 1, other statistics of wage dispersion (based on the lowest
wage) may lead to the opposite conclusion, since most of the probability mass of em-
ployment is close to the optimal assignment. In that region, the wage function W (x) is
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steeper in the case without commitment, leading to larger wage di¤erentials.9
Constrained e¢ ciency
Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2010) show that for the special case,  = 1 (on-
and o¤-the-job search equally e¢ cient) and a quadratic job search technology,  = 1, com-
mitment yields constrained e¢ ciency. By the zero prot condition, rms create vacancies
till the point that the net present value of expected quasi rents (1  u) (ExY   ExW ) is
equal to the cost of a vacancy. Since non-commitment generates higher quasi rents for
rms than commitment, non-commitment leads to excess vacancy creation. Cai et.al.
(2014) show numerically that the e¢ ciency result for the case of commitment extends to
lower values of  ; 0:25 <  < 1.10
9This is also the reason that the min-mean wage di¤erential used in Hornstein et.al. (2010) is more
sensitive to small variations in the models parameters and to measurement error in the minimum. Since
our approach uses the max-mean wage di¤erential, it is less sensitive to this problem.
10For  < 1, the standard congestion externalities apply and in that case the commitment case does
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3 Estimation
3.1 Measuring mismatch
Our basic strategy for empirical inference is the same as in Gautier and Teulings (2006).
They estimate the output loss due to search frictions for a model without OJS. This
subsection rst summarizes their results and then we extend them to the case with OJS.
Gautier, Teulings and Van Vuuren (2005) show that the Taylor approximations of the
search equilibrium in a hierarchical model without OJS correspond one-to-one to the
equilibrium in a circle model. We apply the same analogy here. In this analogy, it makes
sense to talk about a workers type s as an index of her skill and about the jobs type c as
an index of its complexity. The idea is to establish empirical counterparts for these skill and
complexity indices and then calculate the implied mismatch indicator as the di¤erence
not generate the socially e¢ cient outcome.
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between both indicators: x  s   c. Skilled workers are assumed to have an absolute
advantage in any job type and have a comparative advantage in complex jobs. Hence, in a
Walrasian equilibrium, better-skilled workers earn higher wages. Comparative advantage
as dened here requires log supermodularity in the production function: better skilled
workers are relatively more productive in more complex jobs. Therefore, skilled workers
sort into complex jobs and hence wages are an increasing function of job complexity. Those
features do not necessarily carry over to a world with search frictions (see Shimer and
Smith, 2000), but under a log supermodular production function they do in expectation.11
We use these positive correlations between the worker skill and job-complexity indices
on the one hand, and wages, on the other hand to construct indices of workers skill
11See Gautier and Teulings (2006) footnote 7 for a more detailed analysis of this issue. See also
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011).
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and jobs complexity. For this purpose, we run two regressions: one of demeaned log
wages on worker characteristics, like gender, race, years of education and experience, and
one on job characteristics, like occupation and industry dummies. Details are in Web
appendix C.7. The estimated parameter vector can then be used to construct indices
for the observed worker and job characteristics bs and bc. Both indices bs and bc have zero
mean (since wages are demeaned) and are uncorrelated to their unobserved components
"s and "c; respectively. Thus, the skill measure is the predicted log wage conditional on
standard worker characteristics and the job complexity level is the predicted log wage
conditional on job characteristics. Having estimated both indices, the proxy for x is
constructed as bx  bs   bc. This way of constructing the skill index bs implies that the
choice of dimension of s is such that the Mincerian rate of return on the skill index is
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equal to one: dEx [lnW ] =ds = dEx [lnW ] =dbs = 1. Moreover, this specication implies
that lnW is linear in bs and bc. A similar implication holds for the complexity index bc.
These characteristics are just convenient normalizations of the units of measurements that
imply no loss of generality.
Gautier and Teulings (2006) run wage regressions for six countries where they enter
both bs and bc simultaneously, joint with their second order terms
lnW = !0 + !sbs+ !cbc+ !ssbs2 + !scbsbc+ !ccbc2 + ":
Since neither E[bs2], nor E[bsbc], nor E[bc2] are equal to zero, an intercept is added to the
regression. This intercept will play a crucial role. For all six countries ss < 0; sc > 0;
and cc < 0, and roughly sc =  2ss =  2cc. This nding is consistent with the idea
that the nal three terms measure the e¤ect of the mismatch indicator bx2 = (bs  bc)2 on
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wages. Below we reiterate their result for the United States, which are taken from the
March supplements of the CPS 1989-1992 (t-values in brackets).
lnW = 0:013
(8:9)
+ 0:61bs
(182:4)
+ 0:66bc
(207:7)
  0:17bs2
(21:2)
  0:17bc2
(21:6)
+ 0:43bsbc
(36:6)
;
lnW = 0:024
(14:7)
+ 0:61bs
(182:2)
+ 0:66bc
(207:5)
  0:20
(35:1)
bx2; (10)
Var [bx] = 0:120: (11)
The coe¢ cients on bs and bc are between zero and one and highly signicant. Since at
the optimal assignment there is a one-to-one correspondence between s and c, we cannot
conclude much from the rst order terms. The one could be a proxy for the measurement
error in the other and the other way around. The second-order terms enter also highly
signicantly, with the expected signs. In the second regression we impose the restriction
sc =  2ss =  2cc. Although a formal F-test rejects them due to the large number of
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observations, these restrictions hold almost perfectly. This applies to all six countries.
Gautier and Teulings (2006) provide two arguments why the second order terms are
likely to capture the e¤ect of search frictions, which we reiterate here shortly. First, when
observed and unobserved worker and job characteristics are distributed jointly normal,
it is impossible for second-order terms to be a proxy for the unobserved component of a
rst-order term, because the correlation of a second-order term in bs and/or bc with the
unobserved skill index is a third moment and third moments of a normal distribution are
equal to zero. Second, the interpretation of these coe¢ cients as capturing the concavity of
the wage function implies sign restrictions, which are met for all three coe¢ cients for all six
countries. We add one new argument here.12 If the signicance of the second-order terms
is indeed driven by the concavity of the wage function in the mismatch indicator, then their
12We thank Jean Marc Robin for the idea of this test.
38
sign would depend on bs and bc capturing worker and job characteristics respectively. To the
contrary, if both vectors were composed out of mixtures of job and worker characteristics
(e.g. experience and occupation dummies in bs and education and industry dummies in bc)
then the concavity result should not come out. Equation (12) demonstrates this by putting
education and occupation in bs, while equation (13) demonstrates it by putting education
and industry in bs (and the remaining variables in bc). In both cases, the concavity result
disappears
lnW = 0:00
(0:0)
+ 0:52bs
(132:6)
+ 0:65bc
(175:2)
  0:01bs2
(0:9)
  0:04bc2
(4:1)
+ 0:09bsbc
(6:2)
(12)
lnW = 0:00
(0:0)
+ 0:32bs
(79:9)
+ 0:81bc
(233:2)
  0:01bs2
(4:4)
+ 0:01bc2
(1:1)
+ 0:05bsbc
(3:5)
(13)
Also note that the constant moves towards zero in that case. Hence, the concavity result
in (10) is not a statistical artifact.
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The quadratic terms in equation (10) correspond nicely to the model without OJS,
where the wage function W (x) follows a smooth parabola, see Figure 1. Then, the only
remaining question is to what extent the coe¢ cient on bx2 is a¤ected by measurement
error. Here, we want to apply this methodology to a model with OJS. But then we have
to nd a method for tting a wage function that is not a simple parabola, but a more
complicated function that is non-di¤erentiable at x = 0. This question will be addressed
below.
3.2 Capturing the shape of W (x)
The rst step in nding a tractable approach to estimating the function lnW (x) is to
consider a simple Taylor expansion around the optimal assignment, x = 0. In section
4 when we calibrate the model, we will use the exact expressions and test how well the
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approximations below perform. Start from the circle model. Then
lnW (x) = !0   !2 jxj+O
 
x2

; (14)
where we demean the data on lnW , such that Ex lnW = 0. The wage curves in Figure
1 imply that !2 > 0. If there were no search frictions, then x = 0 at all job types and
therefore !0 = 0. By construction, !0 is approximately equal to our measure of wage
dispersion, the max-mean wage di¤erential.
!0 = !2E [jxj] = lnW (0)  Ex lnW & lnW (0)  lnExW & W (0)  ExW: (15)
The rst equality follows from taking expectations at the left- and right-hand sides of (14)
and using Ex lnW = 0 (by demeaning). The second equality follows from evaluating (14)
at x = 0: The next approximate equality is due to Jensens inequality, lnExW &Ex lnW .
For the third step, note that for small search frictions and accordingly, small wage
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di¤erentialsExW . W (0) . 1, the approximation lnW . W   1 applies. Finally, since
W (0) ' 1, W (0) ExW ' [W (0)  ExW ] =W (0). Hence, !0 is a convenient statistic for
the relative wage loss due to search frictions.
In practice we observe x with a fair amount of measurement error. What are the
implications of this? Let "x  "c   "s be the measurement error in the observed signal bx;
bx = x+ "x; (16)
with Cov[x; "x] = 0.13 Hence, Var[bx] =Var[x] + 2" , where 2" Var["x]. Measurement
error is particularly relevant when estimating the e¤ect of mismatch, since the observed
13By construction, Cov["s; bs] = Cov["c;bc] = 0. Hence, "s and "c measure unobserved heterogeneity
in s and c. This does not apply to the mismatch indicator bx, where Cov["x; bx] > 0. This can be
seen most easily by considering the limiting case of zero search frictions (the Walrasian equilibrium),
where Var[x] = 0 and Var[bx] =Var["x]  0, since s = c and hence "x = bx. For small search frictions,
Var[x] Var["x], Cov["x; x] = 0. Hence, "x can be interpreted as pure classical measurement error
in the observed mismatch indicator bx. The signal-to-noise ratio that we nd empirically supports this
interpretation, see Section 4.
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mismatch bx can either be due to true mismatch or to measurement error. In a perfect
Walrasian world, there is no mismatch, since s = c for each job. Hence, x = 0. A careless
researcher would observemismatch since the observed skill and complexity indexes are
not equal, bs 6= bc; due to unobserved heterogeneity in s and c. Hence, the observed
mismatch bx is equal to the measurement error: bx = bs   bc = "x since x = 0 for each
job. Failing to correct for the impact of measurement error will therefore overestimate
the importance of mismatch.
Dene the signal-to-noise ratio R Var[x] =Var[bx]. If the approximation of lnW (x)
in equation (14) would be exact, estimating this equation with OLS (replacing jxj by jbxj)
would yield a downwardly-biased estimate of !2 for two reasons. First, attenuation bias
due to measurement error biases the coe¢ cient on the explanatory variables towards zero;
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and second, there is the strong convexity at zero. Due to this convexity,
E [jxj jbx]  jbxj :
The closer bx is to zero, the stronger this inequality. This is documented in Figure 3, where
we present three functions, jbxj, E[jxj jbx], and the least-squares estimation of E[jxj jbx] =
0 + 2bx2+ ", for the case that both the true value x and measurement error "x are
normally distributed both with variance equal to unity. The least-squares approximation
of E[jxj jbx] turns out to be extremely precise for the relevant range between plus- and minus
two standard deviations of bx 2 [ 2; 2]. This justies the idea of approximating equation
(14) by a regression model of w with a quadratic term bx2:
lnW = !0   !2bx2 + "; (17)
where " is a zero mean error term. This is a surprising result: while the wage function
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W (x) with OJS is entirely di¤erent from the wage function without OJS, a second order
polynomial is again an accurate approximation of the relation between log wages and the
observed proxy for mismatch, bx in the presence of measurement error.
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
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Figure 3: Smoothing of an absolute value function by random mixing for 2x = 
2
" = 1:
jxj (black thin), E[jxj jx^] (blue dotted), least- squares estimate (red solid)
The following proposition relates the least-squares estimate !0 to the underlying co-
e¢ cient !0.
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Proposition 1 Suppose (i) that the true model is given by
lnW = !0   !2 jxj ;
where both lnW and x are normalized to have a zero mean, (ii) that we observe only
bx = x + "x where both x and "x are distributed normally with Var[x] =Var[bx]  R; (iii)
that we estimate equation (17) by OLS. Then,
plim!0 =
1
2
R!0 =
1
2
R!2Ejxj:
Proof : See Appendix A.3.
Hence, when there is no measurement error in the observed signal bx (R = 1), the
estimated intercept !0 is equal to half the true intercept !0. This underestimation by
a factor two is due to the imperfect approximation of the absolute value function by a
parabola. When on top of this imperfection in the functional form, there is also measure-
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ment error in the signal bx, the underestimation becomes more severe. However, as Figure
3 shows, a parabola provides a very good description for E[jxj] when x is convoluted with
measurement error, in particular when R < 1=2. Hence, using a parabola is an e¢ cient
way of estimating !0. Given the measurement error in the data, one cannot do much
better by using alternative estimation methods. The estimate of !0 is proportional to the
signal-to-noise ratio R: Under the assumption of joint normality of bx and "x, Proposition
2 and equation (15) imply that the intercept !0 underestimates the true magnitude of
wage dispersion by a factor 2=R:
W (0)  ExW
W (0)
= 2
R
!0: (18)
Equation (18) provides a very convenient relation. Twice the intercept of a simple OLS
regression, 2!0, provides a robust estimate for the magnitude of the wage loss due to search
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frictions. The estimation results in equation (10) imply !0 = 0:024. Hence, the relative
wage loss due to mismatch [W (0)  ExW ] =W (0) is at least 4.8%. This is the limiting
case of R = 1, when there is no measurement error. In the presence of measurement error,
the wage loss due to mismatch is larger.
Since Var[x] = RVar[bx], the productivity loss due to mismatch follows from
Y (0)  ExY = 1
2
E[x2] =
1
2
RVar [bx] :
Conditional on , the variance of the observed mismatch indicator Var[bx] overestimates the
productivity loss due to mismatch by a factorR, exactly the reverse of the underestimation
of the expected wage dispersion. The latter is due to the fact that part of the variance of a
noisy mismatch indicator does not reect true mismatch, but just noise. The elimination
48
of R from these two expressions yields
[W (0)  ExW ] [Y (0)  ExY ] = fW (B; ; ; ) eY (B; ; ; ) = !0Var [bx] : (19)
Equation (19) is a key equation. It establishes a relation between the four parameters of
the model, B; ;  and  on the left hand side and the parameter  and the estimated
statistics !0 and Var[bx] on the right hand side. For given , the product of wage and
productivity dispersion is not a¤ected by measurement error. More measurement error in
x, increases Var[bx] by the same factor as it decreases !0:
3.3 Measuring  and its role in identication
Teulings (2005) shows that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the Katz
and Murphy (1992) elasticity of complementarity between low and high skilled workers,
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low-high, and the parameter .14 Katz and Murphy estimate this elasticity to be 1.4 for
the period 1963-87: a 1% increase in the ratio between high- and low-skilled workers
yields a 1.4% fall in the relative wages of high-skilled workers. Suppose that the data
are generated by a continuous type model like ours, but that the researcher arbitrarily
divides the workforce into two groups, high and low skilled, where all workers below a
certain threshold value for s are assigned to the low skilled group and all workers above
that threshold are assigned to the high skilled group. When this researcher then tries to
estimate low-high, he will obtain the following result:
 =
1
Var [lnW ] low-high
= 1
0:40 low-high :
14In the web appendix C.6, we show that the units of s (dE[lnW ] =ds = 1) are the same as in Teulings
(2005) so we can transfer his ndings to this paper.
50
Katz and Murphy (1992)s benchmark value for low-high of 1:4 yields (using the empirical
value for Var[lnW ] of 0.40)  = 1:8. Their discussion on pages 71-72 suggests that for the
period 1975-87, choosing low-high = 4, performs better than 1:4. The alternative value for
low-highof 4 yields  = 0:6. Better substitutability of worker types reduces the output loss
due to mismatch.
Figure 4 illustrates the situation for both the commitment and non-commitment cases,
using the benchmark values for B;  ; and  from the next section. The upward-sloped
curve (red) consists of combinations of wage loss fW (B; ; ; ) and productivity loss
eY (B; ; ; ) from equation (9). Each point on the curve corresponds to di¤erent values
of . When there are more search frictions (low ), there is both more wage dispersion
and more mismatch. The downward-sloped curve (blue) reects equation (19), using
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the values of !0; and Var[bx] discussed above. This yields a hyperbolic relation between
fW (B; ; ; ) and eY (B; ; ; ). Each point on this curve corresponds to a di¤erent value
of the signal-to-noise ratio R. In the North-West, R = 1 andfW (B; ; ; ) = 2!0 = 4:8%.
Note that R is not a completely free parameter because the model restricts the curves
to intersect at values for R  1. The lower R, the more Var[bx] overestimates Var[x] and
hence eY (B; ; ; ), but the more fW (B; ; ; ) is underestimated. The intersection of
both curves determines  and R.
Wage di¤erentials are generally larger than productivity di¤erentials, which is due to
the fact that the derivative of the production function is zero in the optimum, Y 0 (0) = 0,
while the wage function is non-di¤erentiable at that point. Since x = 0 is the point
with the highest density, this point matters a lot for the relative size of productivity
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and wage di¤erentials.15 The ultimate test of the model is to see whether the implied
value of unemployment is realistic. Figure 5 plots the relation between fW (B; ; ; ) and
u (B; ; ; ). The two points on the curves in Figures 4 and 5 denote the exact solutions,
which will be discussed in Section 4. A higher value of  shifts the locus of equation (19)
to the North-East in Figure 4. For a given amount of wage dispersion, a higher  implies
more output loss due to mismatch (1
2
Var[bx]). At the intersection with the upward sloped
locus of equation (9), both fW (B; ; ; ) and eY (B; ; ; ) are higher. Figure 5 shows
that the higher value of fW (B; ; ; ) that corresponds to  = 1:8, implies a value of the
unemployment rate around 10% (the exact solutions imply a lower u).
15Note that for the model without OJS in Gautier and Teulings (2006), productivity di¤erentials are
always larger than wage di¤erentials.
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Figure 5: Unemployment (B = 0:4,  = 0:54)
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3.4 The values of B and  
Hall and Milgrom derive a value for B based on UI benets of 0.25 and an estimated
Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1. This implies a value of B = 0:71.16 In our setting,
where we are interested in the mean or median worker, such a high value would have the
unpleasant implication that if nobody would work in the US, per capita output would
only be 27% lower than in case everybody would be at her optimal job. Therefore, we
think it is more reasonable to set B = 0:4 following Shimer (2005). As a robustness check,
we also calibrate our model for B = 0:6.
The value of  is identied from the relation between the ratio of the (average)
16Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Hall (2009) seek to explain the cyclical behavior of unemploy-
ment, so they use larger values for B. For these studies, the value of non-market time of the marginal
worker is relevant whereas here we are interested in the value of non-market time for the average worker,
which justies a lower value of B.
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employment-to-employment hazard rate, fee; and the employment-to-unemployment haz-
ard rate, feu, see Appendix A.2
fee
feu
=
1 + q
q
ln (1 + q)  1; (20)
q   1  u (B; ; ; )
u (B; ; ; )
:
Since q is an increasing function of fee=feu, its inverse exists. Denote this inverse by
	
 
fee=feu

. Hence,  = u(B; ;;)
1 u(B; ;;)	
 
fee=feu

. Identication of the model proceeds along
the same lines as in Figure 4, but now taking B and fee=feu as given instead of B and  .
Monthly transition rates from 1967-2010 similar to Shimer (2007) imply that feu =
2:13% per month for the mean worker. The value of fee is 2.7% according to Fallick
and Fleischman (2004), 2.9% according to Nagypal, and 3.3% according to Moscarini and
Vella (2008), applying a correction for missing records in the CPS.17 Hence, for the mean
17Nagypals values come from the SIPP and the CPS. She argues that those estimates are down-
56
worker, 2:7
2:13
(= 1:27)  fee=feu  3:32:13(= 1:55):18
If we consider the median worker, a lower value for feu applies. This can be seen as
follows. According to the BLS statistics, median tenure is 4.6 years.19 In the absence
of duration dependence and ignoring the ow out of the labor force, the total hazard
out of the current job, fee + feu, is 1.3%.20 The transition rate feu (the equivalent of
) is assumed to be constant in our model, while the unconditional transition rate, fee;
exhibits negative duration dependence due to heterogeneity in the match quality x: high
quality matches survive. Negative duration dependence implies that the hazard rate for
wardly biased because when workers change jobs it is not uncommon for them to experience a short
unemployment spell. In the data, this yields an employment-unemployment transition followed by an
unemployment-employment transition. This bias might be larger than the time aggregation bias in the
unemployment outow rate.
18We thank Bart Hobijn for sharing his data.
19www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf
20Ignoring ows out of the labor force, the total hazard out of employment can be solved from 1  
exp [ 55 (fee + feu)] = 0:5:
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low-tenure workers is above 1.3% and the rate for high-tenure workers is below 1.3%.
Since feu is constant, it must be smaller than 1.3%, much lower than the value reported
by Shimer. This implies that the assumption of the absence of duration dependence of feu
is rejected by the data. Apparently, a small group of weakly attached workers frequently
transits between unemployment and employment. In order to capture this feature of
reality, other mechanisms must be introduced (such as learning, see Moscarini (2005);
or random growth, see Buhai and Teulings (2014)). This falls outside the scope of this
paper. Hence, our model is unable to explain this feature of reality. We set fee=feu = 1:75
in our preferred calibration, but we check the robustness of our results for higher values
of fee=feu in Appendix B.
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4 Calibration
The methodology applied in the previous section requires two approximations. First, we
approximate lnW (x) by a rst order Taylor expansion in Section 3.2, using the absolute
value transformation:  !2 jxj. Second, we approximate the distribution of x by the
normal distribution, see Proposition 2, while its actual distribution is far from normal,
see Figure 2. In this section, we use the exact expressions to calibrate our model. The
calibration proceeds as follows,
1. We set B = 0:4 and  = 1:8 (our preferred values, see the discussion in the previous
section).
2. Take starting values for  and .
3. Var[x] can be calculated directly, see (31) in Web Appendix C.5. The variance of
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the measurement error distribution, 2" ; can be calculated from
2" = Var[x^] Var [x] ;
using the empirical value Var[x^] = 0:12. Note that consistency requires Var[x^] 
Var[x], which is an additional test for the model (i.e. the intersection of the blue and
red curve in Figure 4 occurs before the end point of the blue curve that corresponds
to R = 1 in the north west). This condition turns out to hold in our calibration.
4. The fee=feu ratio in the model follows from (20) while the simulated !0 is obtained
as follows. First draw values from bG(x), see (8). Next, add measurement error
using the value of 2" from step 3 and run regression (17). Compare the simulated
values for fee=feu and !0 to the empirical values, fee=feu = 1:75 and !0 = 0:0241.
As long as they do not match, adjust  and  and return to step 2 till convergence
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is reached.
This procedure converges fast (also for the alternative calibration in Web Appendix
B).
Table 1 presents the implied values for our key variables.
u(%)  W (0)  ExW
x100
ExW=W (x) Y (0)  ExY
x100
R(%)
commitment yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
4:72 4:48 0:58 0:54 6:04 8:01 1:51 1:44 2:32 2:39 21:5 22:2
Table 1: Calibration results for B = 0:4; fee=feu = 1:75;  = 1:8
The implied unemployment rate in Table 1 is in the reasonable range for both the
commitment (4:72%) and non-commitment case (4:48%). Hence, the data do not allow
us to discriminate between commitment and non-commitment. On-the-job search is about
half as e¢ cient as o¤-the-job search. The mean-min ratio predicted by the model is similar
to the one reported by Hornstein et al. (2010) if they use the 10th percentile as the lowest
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wage. The signal-noise ratio R may appear low at rst sight. However, remember that
R would be 0 in the Walrasian case, see the discussion regarding equation (16). Hence,
there is no natural lower bound for R.
Our results also show that the approximations in Section 3.2 overestimated unemploy-
ment and wage dispersion. For the no commitment case, the approximations suggested
that, W (0) ExW = 11% and u = 10% while for the commitment case, the approxi-
mations would give W (0) ExW = 11% and u = 11%: In the simulations where we use
the exact values we get less wage dispersion (W (0) ExW equals for commitment and no
commitment respectively 6% and 8%) and a lower unemployment rate of 4:5%: The high
values in the approximations were mainly due to the fact that there we assumed that x
followed a normal distribution rather than the actual distribution bG(x) that we use here
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(which is far from normal). The linear approximation of the wage function applied in (14)
had little e¤ect.
In Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix B we present the calibration results for 8 other combi-
nations of the parameters B; fee=feu; and . The calibration with B = 0:6,  = 1:8 and
fee=feue = 1:3 gives an implausibly large frictional unemployment rate of 11%. In general,
for B = 0:6, the unemployment rate is a bit higher and for  = 0:6, it is a bit lower than
for our baseline analysis.  can increase to almost 1 if we use B = 0:6, fee=feu = 1:75
and  = 1:8: For the no commitment case, unemployment varies between 2:8 and 12:7 for
the eight di¤erent congurations.
Figure 6 illustrates what happens if we use di¤erent parameters in the calibration. For
example, if we calibrate the model with a higher value of B, this makes the theoretical
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relationship between wage dispersion and mismatch steeper (the yellow curve). With a
higher B, it is harder to generate wage dispersion. A given level of wage dispersion is
then associated with more frictions and consequently more mismatch. However, at the
new intersection, the corresponding unemployment rate and  are no longer consistent
with the empirical value of fee=feu. Therefore,  must increase to shift the yellow curve
back and this is depicted by the green dotted curve. Figure 7 gives the corresponding
values of unemployment.
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4.1 Composition of the output loss and the business-stealing
externality
Table 2 shows for our baseline parameters that if rms can commit to wages, the output
loss, X, due to search frictions is 10:0% while if rms cannot commit, it is 15:5%. A large
share of the output loss in the non-commitment case is due to vacancy creation. This is
due to the fact that we assume free entry, or equivalently, an innite elasticity of vacancy
creation with respect to prots per worker. In reality, there will be imperfect competition
and part of the prots will be captured by the owners of the rm.
Commitment yes no
u(1 B) 2:84 2:69
(1  u) [ExY   ExW ] 4:43 10:48
(1  u) [Y (0)  ExY ] 2:21 2:28
X (%) 9:48 15:45
Table 2: Decomposition of output loss due to frictions forB = 0:4,  = 1:8 and
fee=feu = 1:75
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The large value of (1  u) (ExY   ExW ) for the non-commitment case is socially ine¢ -
cient because of a business-stealing externality (see Gautier et al. 2010). The idea is that
without commitment, when opening a vacancy, individual rms do not internalize the
future output loss of the rm from which they poach a worker. Although the transitions
of workers to better matches are always e¢ cient, the expected productivity gains are too
small to justify, from a social point of view, the entry cost of the marginal rm. Tables 5
and 6 in Appendix B present the estimated output loss for the eight di¤erent calibrations
and nd that X varies between 6:42% (commitment, B = 0:4,  = 0:6; fee=feu = 1:75)
and 18:78% (non-commitment, B = 0:6,  = 1:8; fee=feu = 1:3).
Estimating the business-stealing externality
Table 2 is not suitable to estimate the business-stealing e¤ect because it keeps constant
67
the outcome variable fee=feu, and not the parameter . In order to estimate the business-
stealing e¤ect, we use for the commitment case the same parameter values, B = 0:4,
 = 1:8; and  = 0:54 as in the no-commitment case. Under commitment, there is no
excessive vacancy creation (vK reduces to 4:67) and this makes the unemployment rate
slightly higher (5:05%). The output loss due to mismatch under commitment is almost
the same (2:33) as for the original calibration. The total output loss due to search frictions
is now 15:45% for no commitment and 10:03% for commitment. The di¤erence of almost
5:5% points is the welfare loss due to the existence of a business-stealing externality that
arises if rms cannot commit to wages contingent on x: Note that this estimate is based
on the assumption that all excessive rents of the ine¢ cient wage mechanism are spent on
vacancy creation. If the rents end up at the rm owners, the losses will be smaller, since
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they will derive utility from this income.
5 Conclusion
Due to frictions, only a subset of the contacts between vacancies and workers results in a
match, and this creates (i) unemployment, (ii) wage dispersion amongst identical workers
and (iii) mismatch. This paper contributes to the literature by measuring these manifes-
tations of search frictions and presenting a model that can jointly explain them (allowing
for measurement error). Our methodology yields a very simple and tractable method
for estimating wage dispersion due to search frictions using a simple OLS regression on
worker and job characteristics. We use the analogy to hedonic pricing models to derive the
curvature of the production function from Katz and Murphys estimate of the elasticity
of complementarity between high and low skilled workers. The output loss due to search
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frictions only depends on four parameters: the value of non-market time B, the relative
e¢ ciency of on-the job search,  and a composite parameter that captures everything
that a¤ects frictions (the e¢ ciency of matching, the discount rate, the job destruction
rate, vacancy creation cost and a parameter measuring the cost of mismatch).
Search frictions generate output losses directly due to the suboptimal allocation of
resources, and indirectly, because decentralized wage mechanisms potentially come with
distortions. Allowing for two-sided heterogeneity is extremely important because it is
the interaction between the search frictions, the type distributions and the production
technology that determines how important these frictions are. If workers and rms are
identical, then all contacts result in a match. Under two-sided heterogeneity, the produc-
tion technology matters because it determines how much output is lost due to mismatch.
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The more di¢ cult it is to substitute between worker types, the greater this output loss.
By combining information on wage dispersion and the substitutability of worker types we
can learn about the actual amount of frictions and the importance of a precise match.
We then use our model to quantify and decompose this total output loss. Traditionally,
most of the macro labor literature has focussed on unemployment, but our results imply
that mismatch and job creation cost are also important. We nd that this total loss is
between 9% and 16%, depending on whether rms can or cannot commit to wages, on the
value of non-market time and on the e¢ ciency of onrelative to o¤-the-job search. Gau-
tier and Teulings (2006) did not allow for on-the-job search, and therefore substantially
overestimated the output loss due to frictions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Reducing the number of parameters
Consider the economy described in Section 2.2. Take the expressions for W (x) and x
from Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2010) for the no commitment case (equation
20), using Sv = 121 and   =(+ ) yields,
W (x) = 1  

1 +  x
( )2
log

1 +  x
1 +  x

  x  x
 
  1
2
x (x  2x)

:
G(x) is given by
G (x) = 1  x  x
(1 +  x)x
: (21)
21In their case, the model is even more extended,  = 0Sv. We just substituted  for this combination.
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where x follows from (1).
A.2 feefeu ratio
fee = (+ )
R x
0
 (1  u) g (x)xdx
(1  u) = (+ ) 
(1 +  x)
 2x
Z  x
0
x
(1 + x)2
dx
= (+ )

1 +  x
 x
ln ( x+ 1)  1

:
using feu = +  yields equation (20).
A.3 The proof of Proposition 2
Let x  N (0; 2x) and "x  N (0; 2"). x and "x are independent. Let w  lnW E[lnW ]:
The data-generating process for w is,
w = !0   !2jxj
where !0 = !2Ejxj.
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The regression we run is
w = !0 + !2(x+ "x)
2 + :
The claim is
!0 ! 1
2
R!2Ejxj;
where R = Var[x]Var[x]+Var["x] .
Claim 1: Ejxj =
q
2

Var[x] and !0 = !2
q
2

Var[x].
Proof.
Ejxj = Var[x]
Z 1
0
x
2p
2
e 
x2
2 dx
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Let s = x2=2, then we have x =
p
2x and dx = 1p
2s
ds.
Ejxj = Var[x]
r
2

Z 1
0
e sds
= Var[x]
r
2

Note we have !0 = !2Ejxj.
Claim 2: !0 =  !2(Var[x]+Var["x])
Proof.
0 = w = !0 + !2E(x+ "x)2
= !0 + !2(Var[x] +Var["x])
Note !2 ! cov[(x+"x)2;!0 !2jxj]var[(x+"x)2] :
Claim 3: Var[(x+ "x)2] = 2(Var[x]+Var["x])2.
Proof. Note that Ex4 = 3Var[x]2, and x is independent of "x.
86
Claim 4: cov[(x+ "x)2; !0   !2jxj] =  Var[x]3=2:
q
2

!2.
Proof. Since E(!0   !2jxj) = 0,
cov[(x+ "x)2; !0   !2jxj] = E[(x2 + 2x"x + "2x)(!0   !2jxj)]
= E(!0x2   !2jxj)
= Var[x]3=2!0
Z 1
0
x2
2p
2
e 
x2
2 dx
 Var[x]3=2!2
Z 1
0
x3
2p
2
e 
x2
2 dx
Now we can use the same transformation as we did previously. Let s = x2.
E(!0x2   !2jxj3) = 2x!0
2p

Z 1
0
s1=2e sds Var[x]3=2!22
p
2p

Z 1
0
se sds
= Var[x]!0
2p

 (
3
2
) Var[x]3=2!22
p
2p

 (2)
=  Var[x]3=2
r
2

!2:
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where   is the gamma function and in the last step we use claim 1, !0 = !2
q
2

Var[x]3=2.
Proposition 2 !0 ! 12R!2Ejxj = 12R!0.
Proof.
!0 =  !2(Var[x] +Var["x])
=  Cov[(x+ "x)
2; !0   !2jxj]
Var[(x+ "x)2]
(Var[x] +Var["x])
=
!2p
2
Var[x]3=2
Var[x] +Var["x]
=
1
2
R!2Ejxj
where in the third step, we use claim 3.
B Robustness checks
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B  u (%)  W (0)  ExW
x100
ExW
W (x)
1
2
2x(%) R (%)
commitment yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
0:4 0:6 3:95 3:62 0:26 0:24 4:80 5:72 1:20 1:17 2:01 2:22 56 62
0:4 1:8 6:38 5:99 0:43 0:40 7:31 8:46 1:35 1:29 3:06 3:29 28 31
0:6 0:6 6:28 6:11 0:42 0:41 4:80 5:72 1:20 1:17 2:01 2:22 56 62
0:6 1:8 10:53 11:01 0:74 0:78 7:31 8:01 1:35 1:44 3:06 3:29 28 31
Table 3: Calibration results for fee=feu = 1:3
B  u (%)  W (0)  ExW
x100
ExW
W (x)
1
2
2x(%) R (%)
commitment yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
0:4 0:6 3:08 2:84 0:37 0:34 4:09 5:53 1:29 1:25 1:57 1:65 44 46
0:4 1:8 4:72 4:48 0:58 0:54 6:04 8:00 1:51 1:44 2:32 2:39 22 22
0:6 0:6 4:82 4:69 0:59 0:57 4:09 5:53 1:29 1:25 1:57 1:65 44 46
0:6 1:8 7:60 7:85 0:95 0:99 6:05 8:01 1:51 1:44 2:32 2:39 22 22
Table 4: Calibration results for fee=feu = 1:75
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 0:6 1:8
B 0:4 0:6 0:4 0:6
Commitment yes no yes no yes no yes no
u(1 B) 2:37 2:17 2:51 2:44 3:83 3:60 4:21 4:41
vK 3:86 8:38 3:77 8:16 5:73 12:09 5:47 11:44
(1  u) [Y (0)  ExY ] 1:93 2:14 1:88 2:09 2:86 3:09 2:74 2:93
X (%) 8:16 12:69 8:16 12:69 12:42 18:78 12:42 18:78
Table 5: Decomposition of output loss due to frictions for fee=feu = 1:3
 0:6 1:8
B 0:4 0:6 0:4 0:6
Commitment yes no yes no yes no yes no
u(1 B) 1:85 1:71 1:93 1:88 2:84 2:69 3:04 3:14
vK 3:05 7:36 2:99 7:22 4:43 10:48 4:30 10:11
(1  u) [Y (0)  ExY ] 1:52 1:60 1:50 1:57 2:22 2:28 2:15 2:20
X (%) 6:42 10:67 6:42 10:67 9:48 15:45 9:48 15:45
Table 6: Decomposition of output loss due to frictions for fee=feu = 1:75
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C Web Appendix
C.1 Flow conditions
A worker accepts any job o¤er with a wage above his current wage and consequently with
a mismatch indicator smaller than in his current job. Unemployed workers accept only
job o¤ers with x < x. The unemployment rate in this economy is determined by the
following equilibrium ow condition
 (1  u) +  = 2xu+ u: (22)
The left hand side of (22) measures the inow into unemployment. The rst term reects
workers who loose their job and the second term reects the growth of the labor force
(new workers start as unemployed). The right hand side measures the outow. The rst
term is the number of workers who nd a job and the second term captures the fact
1
that the inow should exceed the outow by u to keep unemployment at a constant
fraction of the workforce at the balanced growth (at rate ) path. So for  ! 0 this is
just a simple steady-state ow equation. This relation can be simplied by dening the
parameter   2= (+ ). Then,
u =
1
1 + x
:
Let G [W (x)]  1   G^ (x). Equation (8) follows from substituting (22) into the
following balanced growth equation,
2x fu+  (1  u) [1 G (x)]g   (1  u)G (x) = (1  u)G (x) :
which tells us that the labor force grows at rate  and so does the mass of workers
who are employed at a distance x or less from their optimal job type. The rst term on
the left is the inow into this class and the second term is the outow. Flows from one
2
smaller-than-x job to another cancel out. Equation (8) follows from substituting (22) into
the following balanced growth equation,
2x fu+  (1  u) [1 G (x)]g   (1  u)G (x) = (1  u)G (x) :
which tells us that the labor force grows at rate  and so does the mass of workers
who are employed at a distance x or less from their optimal job type. The rst term on
the left is the inow into this class and the second term is the outow. Flows from one
smaller-than-x job to another cancel out.
C.2 Derivation of the Bellman equations under golden growth
A general way to derive V U and the free entry condition uses a simple accounting identity.
First we start with a general discount rate r, and then we let r approach the population
growth rate  from above.
3
At time 0,
uV U + (1  u)EV E +
Z 1
0
V Ue rtdet = uV U + (1  u)EV E +
Z 1
0
e rtV Uetdt
=
Z 1
0
e rtet (uB + (1  u)EW ) dt
The rst term on the rst line is the total discounted value created by unemployed workers
at time 0; the second term is the total discounted value created by employed workers at
time 0; the third term is the total discounted value of all future generations, where each
new worker starts his career as an unemployed worker. The second line is an alternative
way to aggregate total value in the economy that equals the left hand side because workers
are risk neutral. It simply equals the discounted total value (expected wage income + B)
of all workers from t = 0 onwards. The above equality is essentially an application of the
Fubini theorem.
4
Simplifying the above equation yields,
uV U + (1  u)EV E + V U

1
  re
( r)t
1
0
= (uB + (1  u)EW )

1
  re
( r)t
1
0
V U + (r   )  uV U + (1  u)EV E = uB + (1  u)EW
Letting r &  gives
V U = uB + (1  u)EW:
The derivation for the free entry condition is similar. Suppose that at time 0 the
population is 1 and the number of vacancies equals v. Denote the value of a lled job by
V J . Again, there exists an accounting identity for the total value created by rms in the
economy,
(1  u)EV J + vV V +
Z 1
0
e rtVV ^etdt =
Z 1
0
e rtet ((1  u)(EY   EW ) Kv)
5
where ^ is the adjusted birth rate for vacancies (which is not important because in equi-
librium VV = 0). The expected value of the cross section of lled and vacant jobs should
equal the discounted sum of rm prots minus the amount of resources spent on vacancies.
Since under free entry the expected value of all current and future vacancies equals 0, we
get,
(r   )(1  u)EV J = (1  u)(EY   EW ) Kv
Letting r &  gives
vK = (1  u)(EY   EW ):
The derivation of V E(x) follows Gautier et al. (2010). The Bellman equation for the
6
asset value of employment for a worker employed in a job with mismatch indicator x reads
V E(x) = cW (x) + 2 Z x
0

V E (y)  V E (x) dy    V E (x)  V U : (23)
Totally di¤erentiating yields
(+ )V Ex (x) =
cWx(x)
1 +  x
:
The solution to this di¤erential equation reads
(+ )V E(x) =
xZ
0
cWx(y)
1 +  y
dy + C0:
Integrating by parts yields
(+ )V E(x) =
cW (x)
1 +  x
 cW (0) + xZ
0
 cW (y)
(1 +  y)2
dy + C0:
Evaluation of this equation at x = 0 gives an initial condition that can be used to solve
7
for C0
C0 = cW (0) + V U :
Substitution of this initial condition yields
(+ )V E(x) =
cW (x)
1 +  x
+
xZ
0
 cW (y)
(1 +  y)2
dy + V U : (24)
Dene ExW =
R x
0
cW (x) d bG (x). By equation (8), we have
xZ
0
 cW (y)
(1 +  y)2
dy =
 x
1 +  x
ExW:
Using this expression and V U = V E(x) to evaluate equation (23) at x yields
V E(x) =
cW (x) +  xExW
1 +  x
=
ucW (x) +  (1  u)ExW
u+  (1  u) : (25)
Equation (23) and V U = V E(x) imply
2 
Z x
0

V E (x)  V U dx = V U(x) cW (x) :
8
Substitution of this expression into the Bellman equation for V U yields
V U = B + 2
Z x
0

V E (x)  V U dx = B + xExW
1 + x
= uB + (1  u)ExW; (26)
where the nal step uses u = 1= (1 + x).
Finally, consider the free entry condition. Dene EGY 
R x
0
g (x)Y (x) dx and EGW 
R x
0
g (x)W (x) dx, then,
K = 2
Z x
0
fu+  (1  u) [1 G (x)]g Y (x) W (x)
+  + 2 vx
dx
=
1  u
v
(EGY   EGW ) : (27)
The term, u +  (1  u) [1 G (x)] is the e¤ective labor supply for a type x match. The
second term gives the value of a lled vacancy. It discounts current revenue Y (x) W (x)
by the discount rate  plus the separation rate  plus the quit rate 2 x. The nal line
follows from substituting in (8) and (x = (1  u) =u). This implies that the resources spent
9
on vacancy creation, vK, must in a steady-state equilibrium be equal to the employment
rate (1  u) times the expected prot of a lled vacancy, (EGY   EGW ).
C.3 Derivation of wages
This derivation summarizes the results in Gautier et al. (2010). Conditional on x, rms
choose a wage that maximizes the value of a vacancy,
arg max
W
 n
u+  (1  u)
h
1  bG (W )io Y (x) W
 x bF (W )
!
The FOC with respect to W reads
0 =    (1  u)Gx=Wx
u+  (1  u)
h
1  bG (W )i    xFx=Wx x bF (W )   1Y (x) W ;
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where we use bGW = Gx=Wx and bFW = Fx=Wx. Using Fx = 1=x and some rearrangement
yields,
Wx =  
0@  (1  u)Gx
u+  (1  u)
h
1  bG (W )i +  1 +  x
1A [Y (x) W ] : (28)
Use (8) and its derivative with respect to x to write,
 (1  u)Gx
u+  (1  u)
h
1  bG (W )i =  1 +  x;
and substitute this back in (28) to get
Wx (x) =  2  (Y (x) W (x))
1 +  x
:
This equation is almost identical to equation to the one for no commitment except that
the "2" is replaced by a "1" (at the margin the hiring and no quit premia are equal and
under no commitment there are no hiring premia). For the solution of the di¤erential
equation we refer to Gautier et al. (2010).
11
C.4 Wages and expected wages
Here we combine  and  into one parameter  (as we do in our matlab program). Dene,
  2; x  z=; and x = z=. Note that we can switch back and forth between the
model in terms of (x; ) and (z; ) by the fact that Var[x] = Var[z]. G(x) is given by,
G (x) = 1  x  x
(1 +  x)x
:
Substitution of the expressions for x and x in (21) shows that bG (z) satises
bG (z) = 1  z   z
(1 +  z) z
:
The value of z follows from (7), using 1  u = z= (1 + z) and V E(x) = V U . Substituting
those variables in the wage equations (18,19) of Gautier, Teulings yields,
12
commitment
cW (z) = 1   "1 +  z
 
2
log

1 +  z
1 +  z

  z
 
(1 +  z)2
1 +  z
+
z
 
+
3
2
z2
#
; (29)
EzW =
Z z
0
g (z)cW (z) dz
= 1 
Z z
0
1 +  z
z (1 +  z)2

"
 

1 +  z
 
2
ln

1 +  z
1 +  z

  z
 
(1 +  z)2
1 +  z
+
z
 
+
3
2
z2
#
dz
= 1   1 +  z
 3z
Z  z
0
1
(1 + q)2
"
  (1 + q)2 ln

1 + q
1 +  z

   z (1 + q)
2
1 +  z
+ q +
3
2
q2
#
dq
= 1   3
 3z

 z +
1
2
 2z2   (1 +  z) ln (1 +  z)

:
The expression for  can be derived from combining z = 1 u
u
, (6) and (7)
 =
2 3 (1 B) (1 + z)(1 +  z)
6(1   )(1 +  z)(1 + z) ln(1 +  z)   z [6(1 + z) + 3 (2  z)(1 + z) +  2z(4 + 3z)] :
non-commitment
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cW (z) = 1   1 +  z
 2
ln

1 +  z
1 +  z

  z   z
 
  1
2
z (z   2z)

; (30)
EzW =
Z z
0
g (z)cW (z) dz
= 1 
Z z
0
1 +  z
z (1 +  z)2


1 +  z
 2
ln

1 +  z
1 +  z

  z   z
 
  1
2
z (z   2z)

dz
= 1   1 +  z
 3z
Z  z
0
1
(1 + q)2

(1 + q) ln

1 + q
1 +  z

  q +  z   1
2
q (q   2 z)

dq
= 1   1 +  z
 3z

 1
2
ln2 (1 +  z) +  z ln (1 +  z)  1
2
 2z2
1 +  z

;
Again,  can be derived from z = 1 u
u
, (6) and (7),
 =
2 3 (1 B) (1 +  z) (1 + z)
 2 (1 +  z) (1 + z) z2 + z2   (1   ) (1 + z)2 [2 z   ln (1 +  z)] ln (1 +  z) :
14
C.5 Variance of x
Var [x] =
Z x
0
x2g (x) dx =
1 +  x
x
Z x
0
x2
(1 +  x)2
dx =
1 +  x
 3x
Z  x
0
x2
(1 + x)2
dx (31)
=
 x (2 +  x)  2 (1 +  x) log (1 +  x)
 3x
:
C.6 Measuring 
Let eY (s; c) be the productivity of an s-type worker in a c-type job. We can adjust the
production function to be increasing in s; as follows,
ln eY (s; c) = s  1
2
 (s  c)2 = s  1
2
x2: (32)
The optimal assignment c (s) for worker type s solves the rst-order condition ln eYc [s; c (s)] =
0, implying that c (s) = s. This specication exhibits all features discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1. First, in the Walrasian equilibrium, all workers are assigned to their opti-
mal job type, c (s) = s (and hence x = 0) and wages are equal to output. Hence
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ln eY (s; s) = lncW (s) = s, see equation (10). Second, the function eY (s; c) exhibits
absolute and comparative advantage which is required for the derivation of bs and bc as
discussed in Section (3.1).22 Third, the Mincerian rate of return to skill dEx [lnW ] =ds is
equal to one. Finally, the parameter  in equation (32) is equivalent to the parameter 
in equation (1) by applying a second-order Taylor expansion to Y (x) and eY (s; c), around
the optimal assignment, x = 0:  = Y 00 (0) =Y (0) = eYcc (c; c) =eY (c; c). The parameter 
measures the curvature of Rosens (1974) well known hedonic system where the isoprot
curve and the indi¤erence curve of the worker are tangent to the locus of market wages
and the indi¤erence curve of the worker. This curvature, the second derivative of the
production function, is a measure of both the productivity loss due to mismatch and the
22Comparative advantage requires the cross derivative of lnY (s; c) to be positive; absolute advantage
requires the rst derivative of lnY (s; c) with respect to s to be positive for any c. The latter is not
globally satised for this polynomial specication, but it is in the optimal assignment s = c.
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elasticity of substitution between various workers types. Note that the dimension of this
curvature parameter  corresponds to that of the mismatch indicator x used in Section
(3.1) since the Mincerian rate of return to s is equal to unity in the optimal assignment:
ln eYs (s; s) = 1.
C.7 Constructing skill and job complexity levels
We run the following two regressions
lnW = ~j + "s + "w; (33)
lnW = ~k + "c + "w;
where ~j and ~k are vectors of observed worker and job characteristics respectively, where
"s and "c capture unobserved worker and job characteristics respectively, and where "w
captures the e¤ect of non-optimal assignment on wages and measurement error in wages.
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It is convenient to normalize our data on lnW; ~j and ~k such that they have zero mean.
Hence, it does not make sense to include a constant in these regressions. The estimated
parameter vector can then be used to construct indices for the observed worker and job
characteristics bs  ~j;and bc  ~k. The non-linearities in the relation between lnW on
the one hand and
 !
j and
 !
k on the other are captured by a proper normalization. Then,
the skill index s and the job index c satisfy,
s = bs+ "s;
c = bc+ "s;
Both indices bs and bc have zero mean by construction and are uncorrelated to the unob-
served components "s and "c; respectively.23
23We apply the following iterative procedure such that if we regress lnW on both s and s2 that the
coe¢ cient of the second-order term s2 is zero. First, run lnW = 1 bs1 +2 bs1 2 + "s1, where bs1 is E(sj~j)
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constructed from (33) and where "s1 = s  bs1. Second, we construct a new variable bs2 = 1bs1 +2 bs21 
E

1bs1 + 22bs1 and rerun the rst regression after substituting s2 for s1. We repeat these steps until
2 = 0. The same applies to our regression for c. This algorithm therefore normalizes s in such a way
that any correlation between bs and "s is eliminated.
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